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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FATAL MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND
MISSOURI’S PERVERSE INCENTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to recent developments in medical injury law in Missouri, the
amount of damages a negligent healthcare provider1 is liable for in tort may
depend on the fate of the injured patient. This state of affairs owes its
existence, in part, to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Sanders v.
Ahmed,2 in which the Court held that statutory limitations on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice wrongful death claims are neither in
violation of the State’s right to trial by jury, nor separation of powers
provisions.3 The Missouri Constitution only shields from such legislative
interference jury awards stemming from common law causes of action.4 The
State of Missouri maintains that wrongful death was absent at common
law;5 therefore, the loved ones of victims of fatal medical negligence6 may
1. This Note refers to “healthcare providers” and “physicians” interchangeably, although
in reality the former denotes a more expansive list of professionals than simply physicians. See
MO. REV. STAT. § 538.205(4) (2012) (those defined as healthcare providers include
physicians, hospitals, HMOs, dentists, registered and licensed nurses, chiropractors, and “any
other person or entity that provides health care services under the authority of a license or
certificate . . . .”).
2. 364 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. banc 2012). The other case responsible for this state of affairs
is Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. banc 2012). See infra text
accompanying note 19. Together, these two cases create the imbalance in Missouri medical
malpractice law.
3. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 205.
4. See id. at 204. Medical malpractice has a storied history as an old common law right
of action. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638; Robert I. Field, The Malpractice Crisis Turns 175: What
Lessons Does History Hold for Reform?, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 7, 10 (2011). However, wrongful
death, no matter the predicate tort, has been branded by most jurisdictions as a creature of
statute that is not afforded many of the privileges enjoyed by common law actions. See, e.g.,
Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 1957) (declaring “it is only by virtue of the
wrongful death statutes that any claim or cause of action accrues to the persons named [in the
wrongful death act]”); Tait v. Wahl, 987 P.2d 127, 130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
“causes of action for wrongful death are strictly a matter of legislative grace”); Liff v.
Schildkrout, 404 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (N.Y. 1980) (maintaining that “the common law of this
State . . . does not recognize suits to recover damages for the wrongful death of an
individual.”). There are, however, some past and recent apostates. See Cross v. Guthery, 2
Root 90, 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1794); Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 209, 212 (1860); Hallett v.
Town of Wrentham, 499 N.E.2d 1189, 1192 (Mass. 1986).
5. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 203.
147

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

148

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 7:147

be left uncompensated simply because of the Missouri courts’ readings of
history.
Ronald Sanders experienced this reality after filing suit in the circuit court
of Jackson County, Missouri, for the wrongful death of his wife, Paulette
Sanders.7 Mrs. Sanders was treated at the Medical Center of Independence
in Independence, Missouri, on May 21, 2003, due to “complaints of
numbness in her legs and difficulty walking.”8 After neurologist Iftekhar
Ahmed substituted Depakote, an anti-epileptic drug, in place of her usual
anticonvulsant medications, Dilantin and phenobarbital, Mrs. Sanders
became lethargic and, less than a week following her admittance to the
hospital, experienced a focal seizure.9 Following the seizure, Dr. Ahmed
took her off the Depakote.10 Upon weakening physically and mentally, she
was subsequently sent to a long-term care facility where she died in August
of 2005.11 Mr. Sanders brought suit that same August, adding to his initial
complaint a claim for wrongful death on May 28, 2008.12
Five years after filing suit against Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed and Iftekhar
Ahmed, P.A., Mr. Sanders received a verdict in his favor based on the jury’s
finding that the Depakote prescribed by Dr. Ahmed caused his wife’s brain

6. For the sake of simplicity, this Note refers to plaintiffs in medical wrongful death suits
as the loved ones of victims of medical negligence. More specifically, Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 537.080.1 states that damages in a wrongful death action may be sought:
(1) By the spouse or children or the surviving lineal descendants of any deceased
children, natural or adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the father or
mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive;
(2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled to bring the action, then by the
brother or sister of the deceased, or their descendants, who can establish his
or her right to those damages set out in section 537.090 because of the
death;
(3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2) entitled to bring the action, then by a
plaintiff ad litem. Such plaintiff ad litem shall be appointed by the court
having jurisdiction over the action for damages provided in this section upon
application of some person entitled to share in the proceeds of such action.
Such plaintiff ad litem shall be some suitable person competent to prosecute
such action and whose appointment is requested on behalf of those persons
entitled to share in the proceeds of such action. Such court may, in its
discretion, require that such plaintiff ad litem give bond for the faithful
performance of his duties.
MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080.1(1)–(3) (2012).
7. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 201.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 201.
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damage and death.13 The jury awarded Mr. Sanders and his family $9.2
million in non-economic damages.14 However, pursuant to Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 538.210,15 the State’s statutory cap on non-economic
medical malpractice damages, the trial court decreased the non-economic
damages award to $1,265,207.64 ($632,603.82 per defendant).16 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the trial court’s reduction of
damages.17
Soon after the Sanders decision, the Court in Watts v. Lester E. Cox
Medical Centers declared that limitations on non-economic damages for
common law (i.e., non-wrongful death)18 medical malpractice causes of
action violated the Missouri Constitution’s trial by jury provision.19 Sanders,
however, still bars plaintiffs from recovering the full amount owed to them
for injuries received from the death of a loved one due to a healthcare
provider’s negligence.
Medical malpractice damages law in Missouri belies fairness: death is
now cheaper than life. Part II of this Note provides a brief history of medical
malpractice tort reform and the evolution of damage caps in Missouri.20 Part
III explains the Sanders decision with an eye toward elucidating the current
state of medical wrongful death non-economic damage limitations in
Missouri.21 Following the Sanders discussion, Part IV posits that courts
should apply the mode of analysis used by the Missouri Supreme Court in
the 2003 decision of State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley22 when determining the
scope of Missouri’s jury trial guarantee.23 Such an approach would afford

13. Id. at 201-02.
14. This amount was the sum of past and future non-economic damages. Id. at 202. In
combination with economic damages, Mr. Sanders was originally awarded $10,120,745.88.
Id.
15. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2012), invalidated in part by Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med.
Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 641 (Mo. banc 2012).
16. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 202. Mr. Sanders’s suit accrued before section 538.210’s
2005 amendments became effective. Id. at 200 n.1. Therefore, his award was adjusted for
inflation and was not limited to one cap per case. See id. at 202 n.3. The 2005 amendments
are discussed in Part II.C, infra.
17. Id. at 206.
18. Throughout this Note “personal injury,” “common law,” and “non-fatal” are used
interchangeably to refer to medical malpractice claims brought by injured plaintiffs. Wrongful
death claims brought by the loved ones of victims of fatal medical negligence are termed
“medical wrongful death,” “wrongful death medical malpractice,” “fatal medical malpractice,”
or other similar variations.
19. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 642.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. 95 S.W.3d 82 (Mo. banc 2003).
23. See infra Part IV.
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medical malpractice wrongful death claimants constitutional protection from
statutorily imposed damage caps.24 Part V discusses the perverse incentive
that Sanders, coupled with the later Watts decision, created for Missouri
healthcare providers — that it is cheaper to kill than to injure.25 Lastly, Part
VI submits that the General Assembly must eliminate section 538.210’s
limitations on medical wrongful death non-economic damage awards if a
suit brought under Missouri’s constitution is unsuccessful.26

24. Id.
25. See infra Part V. While section 538.210.1 imposes a cap on medical wrongful death
claims, non-medical malpractice wrongful death claims are not subject to a monetary limit.
See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (2012).
26. See infra Part VI. The General Assembly is not likely to heed this Note’s proposals. In
March of 2013, the Missouri House of Representatives approved House Bill 112 (H.B. 112).
The legislation aimed to re-instate the $350,000 non-economic damages cap partially struck
down by the Court in Watts. See H.B. 112, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 538.210.2
(Mo. 2013). The legislation was not a mere exercise in futility. The Watts Court struck down
section 538.210’s cap as to personal injury medical malpractice actions based on the theory
that caps on damages in common law actions violate Missouri’s right to trial by jury
guarantee. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 1.010, Missouri’s reception statute, states that
“[t]he common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made prior to the fourth
year of the reign of James the First . . . are the rule of action and decision in this state . . . .”
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (2012). However, a statute may override the common law as long as
it does so clearly. See State ex rel. Brown v. III Invs., Inc., 80 S.W.3d 855, 859 (Mo. Ct. App.
2002). Wishing to preempt any judicial meddling based on common law principles, H.B.
112’s draftsmen sought to amend section 1.010 by adding the following sentence to the end
of the statute:
The general assembly expressly excludes from this section the common law of England
as it relates to claims arising out of the rendering or failure to render health care
services by a health care provider, with it being the intent of the general assembly to
replace such claims with statutory causes of action.
Mo. H.B. 112, § 1.010. H.B. 112’s amended section 538.210.1 would complement the new
section 1.010, stating:
A statutory cause of action for damages against a health care provider for personal
injury or death arising out of the rendering of or failure to render health services is
hereby created, replacing any such common law cause of action. The elements of such
cause of action are that the health care provider failed to use that degree of skill and
learning ordinarily used under the same or similar circumstances by similarly situated
health care providers and that such failure proximately caused injury or death.
Id. § 538.210.1. The Missouri Senate failed to approve H.B. 112 before the adjournment of
the legislative session. See Virginia Young & Elizabeth Crisp, Highlights from the 2013
Missouri Legislative Session, STL TODAY (May 18, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/lo
cal/govt-and-politics/political-fix/highlights-from-the-missouri-legislative-session/article_9d21
3073-d8c3-5fe5-b440-43ac41940948.html. Therefore, the perverse incentive in Missouri
medical malpractice law is still extant; however, its cure has not (as of yet) occurred at the
expense of all fatal medical negligence victims’ families.
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II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM IN MISSOURI
The history of medical malpractice tort reform in Missouri consists of
three chapters. The first chapter concerns the enactment of Senate Bill 663
(S.B. 663),27 Chapter 538’s first manifestation, which became effective in
1986.28 S.B. 663 was created to combat the rising costs of insurance
premiums, as well as the proliferation of medical malpractice litigation.29
The second chapter began in 2005 when the General Assembly enacted
House Bill 393 (H.B. 393),30 Chapter 538’s second and most recent
version.31 Sanders was decided near the end of this chapter. Finally, the
current epoch centers on the Missouri Supreme Court’s near-evisceration of
section 538.210 in Watts, decided the same year as Sanders.32 Before
examining these three chapters, however, Part II.A details a general
summary of the remedies available to medical malpractice plaintiffs.
A.

Damages Overview

Malpractice damage awards consist of economic, non-economic, and
punitive damages.33 These remedies are available to both personal injury
and wrongful death claimants. Economic damages are based on relatively
calculable monetary losses, including damages for lost wages.34 Punitive
damages are penalties designed to deter further tortious conduct.35 Non-

27. S.B. 663, 82d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986).
28. Kevin McManus, Comment, Finding a Cure for High Medical Malpractice Premiums:
The Limits of Missouri’s Damage Cap and the Need for Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 895,
900 (2005). Chapter 538 contains Missouri’s medical malpractice provisions. See Paul J.
Passanante & Dawn Mefford, The Effect of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice, 61 J. MO. B.
236, 236 (2005).
29. McManus, supra note 28, at 900.
30. H.B. 393, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005).
31. Passanante & Mefford, supra note 28, at 236.
32. See supra text accompanying note 19.
33. Carly N. Kelly & Michelle Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damage Caps
Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 515, 516 (2005);
Passanante & Mefford, supra note 28, at 241.
34. Kelly & Mello, supra note 33, at 516. See MO. REV. STAT. § 538.205(1) (2012)
(defining economic damages as “damages arising from pecuniary harm including, without
limitation, medical damages, and those damages arising from lost wages and lost earning
capacity . . . .”).
35. Kelly & Mello, supra note 33, at 516. See MO. REV. STAT. § 538.205(10) (defining
punitive damages as “damages intended to punish or deter willful, wanton or malicious
misconduct,
including
exemplary
damages
and
damages
for
aggravating
circumstances . . . .”).
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economic damages, which include damages for “pain and suffering” and
other hard-to-calculate injuries, are the subject of section 538.210.36
Non-economic damages –– those nebulous and non-mathematically
precise remedies –– are viewed as a significant contributing factor to the
high damage awards in many medical malpractice suits.37 Their limitation,
the theory goes, leads to increased savings by insurance companies,
including those companies to reduce insurance premiums.38 Reduced
premiums, in turn, allow healthcare providers to lower prices, which leads to
cheaper and more accessible healthcare.39 Legislative caps on noneconomic damages have been the most visible realization of the tort reform
movement since the enactment of California’s Medical Injury Compensation
Act in 1975.40
B.

S.B. 663 (1986)

Born out of compromise and a desire to combat seemingly repetitive
insurance “crises,”41 S.B. 663 was crafted by representatives from the
insurance, healthcare, and legal fields and became effective in 1986.42 The
legislature’s response to the proliferation of medical malpractice litigation
and the rise of liability insurance premiums, embodied by section
538.210,43 was to limit the amount of recoverable non-economic damages
in medical malpractice claims.44 Specifically, section 538.210 instituted a

36. Kelly & Mello, supra note 33, at 516. See MO. REV. STAT. § 538.205(7) (defining
non-economic damages as “damages arising from nonpecuniary harm including, without
limitation, pain, suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement,
loss of capacity to enjoy life, and loss of consortium but shall not include punitive
damages . . . .”).
37. See Kelly & Mello, supra note 33, at 517.
38. McManus, supra note 28, at 896-97.
39. Id. (quoting Adams v. Childrens Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 904 (Mo. banc
1992)).
40. See Leonard Nelson, et al., Medical Liability and Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH
MATRIX 443, 456 (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (1975) (capping the amount of noneconomic damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions at $250,000); Kelly & Mello,
supra note 33, at 517.
41. See Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 773 (Mo. banc 2010) (per
curiam) (Wolff, J., concurring) (stating that “it seems a rather slow-moving crisis, more a trickle
than a flood,” and speculating that the reduction in malpractice claims since 2005 is the result
of “deterring claims on behalf of the elderly, the disabled and those (mostly women) who do
not work outside the home”).
42. McManus, supra note 28, at 900.
43. Id. at 900-01.
44. Bruce Keplinger, Multiple Damage Caps for Claims Against Health Care Providers, 60
J. MO. B. 116, 116 (2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

FATAL MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MISSOURI’S PERVERSE INCENTIVE

153

$350,000 cap on non-economic damages subject to annual adjustment for
inflation, which was applicable to each defendant in a claim.45
The statute faced a constitutional challenge in 1992 in Adams v.
Children’s Mercy Hospital.46 In Adams, the Court rejected challenges to
section 538.210 on state equal protection, open courts, due process, and
trial by jury grounds.47 The Court held that the cap was “a rational response
to the legitimate legislative purpose of maintaining the integrity of health
care for all Missourians,” and that “the plaintiffs received all the process due
them under law.”48 As for the trial by jury challenge, the Court
(erroneously)49 held that the legislature was able to eliminate or otherwise
alter common law causes of action, and therefore limit plaintiffs’ duly
awarded jury verdicts.50
C. H.B. 393 (2005)
Efforts to reform Missouri’s medical tort system did not end in 1986. H.B
393, which became operative in 2005,51 amended section 538.210 by
eliminating the inflationary adjustment provision in the statute.52 It further
reduced plaintiffs’ abilities to recover by holding all defendants in a medical
malpractice claim subject to one cap.53 Accordingly, the amount of noneconomic damages a plaintiff in a medical negligence suit could recover
was set at no more than $350,000.54 As amended, subsection 1 of the
statute stated: “In any action against a health care provider for damages for
personal injury or death arising out of the rendering or failure to render
health care services, no plaintiff shall recover more than [$350,000] for
noneconomic damages irrespective of the number of defendants.”55
In 2010, the Court in Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center56 determined
that, pursuant to the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition of retrospective

45. Passanante & Mefford, supra note 28, at 242.
46. 832 S.W.2d 898, 898 (Mo. banc 1992).
47. Id. at 905-08.
48. Id. at 904, 907.
49. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 645-46 (stating that “Adams’ erroneous interpretation of article
I, section 22(a) of Missouri’s constitution negated the guarantee of that section that the right
of Missouri citizens to jury trial as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”) .
50. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907.
51. Paul J. Passanante & Dawn M. Mefford, Anticipated Constitutional Challenges to Tort
Reform, 62 J. MO. B. 206, 206 (2006).
52. Passanante & Mefford, supra note 28, at 242.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.1 (2012).
56. 311 S.W.3d 752 (Mo. banc 2010).
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laws,57 H.B. 393 did not apply to claims instituted before August 28, 2005,
H.B. 393’s effective date.58 In Klotz, James and Mary Klotz added Dr.
Michael Shapiro and Metro Health Group (MHG) as defendants in their
malpractice suit against St. Anthony’s Medical Center over two years after
they filed their initial 2004 complaint.59 The trial court decreased the Klotz’s
non-economic damages award as to Dr. Shapiro and MHG, pursuant to
H.B. 393’s amendments.60 However, the Supreme Court held that, because
Mr. and Mrs. Klotz initially filed their action before August 28, 2005, the
amendments were not applicable.61
In his concurring opinion in Klotz, Judge Michael Wolff criticized the
Adams decision.62 Lamenting that case’s holding, he decried the use of caps
in limiting a jury’s verdict, writing:
In enacting the new version of section 538.210, the General Assembly,
unfortunately, may well have been guided by the Court’s decision in
Adams . . . . The best that can be said for Adams is that it arose from the
flawed view, then prevalent, that the right to trial by jury could be modified
or abolished legislatively in particular cases. The limit on juries under
section 538.210 did not exist at common law or in statutes when the people
of Missouri adopted their constitution in 1820 guaranteeing the right to trial
by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.63

Judge Wolff believed that “Adams’s fundamental error is in concluding that
statutory law can trump the constitutional right to jury trial.”64 He anticipated
the Court’s inevitable confrontation with Adams,65 and implored the Court
“to restore the right to trial by jury to its traditional and vital place in our
constitutional system.”66
D. Post-Sanders: Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers (2012)
Following the Sanders decision, the Court was again asked to rule on
the constitutionality of section 538.210. In Watts, plaintiff Deborah Watts
won a jury verdict based on the finding that her newborn son’s devastating

57. MO. CONST. art. I, § 13. Article I, section 13 provides, “[t]hat no ex post facto law,
nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any
irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.” Id.
58. Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 760.
59. Id. at 758.
60. Id. at 758-59.
61. Id. at 760.
62. Id. at 771-74 (Wolff, J., concurring).
63. Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 773-74.
64. Id. at 774.
65. Id. at 773.
66. Id. at 774.
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brain injuries were the result of her physicians’ negligence.67 The trial court
reduced her $1.45 million award in non-economic damages to $350,000,
but the Court, sitting en banc, reversed, holding that statutory caps on noneconomic damages in common law causes of action violate Missourians’
right to trial by jury.68 The Court, in overturning the Adams decision,
declared: “Once the right to a trial by jury attaches, as it does in this case,
the plaintiff has the full benefit of that right free from the reach of hostile
legislation.”69
Subsection 1 of the statute still reads as quoted above in Part II.C;
however, it presently only applies to “action[s] against a health care provider
for damages for . . . death . . . .”70
III. SANDERS V. AHMED
Healthcare providers pitch battle against death and illness every day.
Physicians, nurses, and other professionals who competently undertake
services in the aid of a patient who dies are not to be held civilly liable for
such awful turns of events.71 However, patients rely on healthcare providers
because of their special skills.72 Those professionals who cause a patient’s
death because of their unreasonable failure to competently apply such skills
should be held accountable to the decedent’s family, and the family should
be able to recover the full amount for their pain and suffering, loss of
consortium, and other non-pecuniary injuries stemming from their loved
one’s death.73
Missouri courts hold that wrongful death is statutorily created (i.e., it did
not exist at common law before codification of Missouri’s 1820
67. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 635.
68. Id. at 635, 645-46.
69. Id. at 640.
70. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210.1 (emphasis added).
71. See Ewing v. Goode, 78 F. 442, 443 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897) (“[I]f a failure to cure
were held to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or
surgeon causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to practice the healing
art . . . .”).
72. See, e.g., Susan Dorr Goold & Mack Lipkin, Jr., The Doctor-Patient Relationship:
Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. (SUPPLIMENT) S26, S27
(1999) (writing that vulnerable patients “experience a heightened reliance on the physician’s
competence, skills, and good will”); Franklin D. Cleckley & Govind Hariharan, A Free Market
Analysis of the Effects of Medical Malpractice Damage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live
with Inefficient Doctors?, 94 W. VA. L. REV.11, 64 (1991) (claiming “[i]t is no great secret that
the vast majority of the American public view doctors as god-like”).
73. See Jeff Watters, Comment, Better to Kill Than to Maim: The Current State of Medical
Malpractice Wrongful Death Cases in Texas, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 749, 770 (2008) (imploring
the Texas legislature to “pass a bill to remove the perverse incentive in the law, and give the
families of the victims who die due to medical malpractice the justice they deserve”).
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Constitution).74 Accordingly, the General Assembly may alter or eliminate
the right to bring a wrongful death cause of action.75 The Sanders Court
was presented with an opportunity to declare limits on non-economic
damages for death at the hands of a negligent healthcare provider as
unconstitutional. Instead, the Court upheld such damage caps as part and
parcel of the legislature’s authority, notwithstanding the rights afforded the
citizens of Missouri pursuant to their constitution’s jury trial and separation
of powers provisions.76 Subpart A details the Sanders majority opinion and
Subpart B details the dissent.77
A.

The Majority

Judge William J. Price, Jr., writing for the Sanders majority, rejected Mr.
Sanders’s arguments, holding that section 538.210 neither violated
Missouri’s right to trial by jury, nor separation of powers provisions.78 The
Court deferred to precedent when it declared that wrongful death claims
have no common law antecedent and so may be altered by the
legislature.79 The following sections detail the Court’s jury trial and
separation of powers analyses.80
1. Right to Trial by Jury
Article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution declares: “[T]he right
of a trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate . . . .”81 Courts
divide this provision into two elements: (1) the right to a jury trial “as
heretofore enjoyed” in 1820 when Missouri’s original constitution was
drafted; and (2) the right’s “inviolate” nature in the face of proposed
limitations.82 If a cause of action enjoyed the right to a jury determination in
1820, or is analogous to such an action, the right, including the factual
determinations made by the jury, is free from encroachment by the
legislature.83 The Court in Sanders saw no reason to proceed to the

74. See Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993).
75. See Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609, 616 (Mo. 1965), overruled
on other grounds by Bennett v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 896 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. banc
1995).
76. See infra Part III.A and B.
77. See id.
78. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 205.
79. Id. at 203.
80. See infra Part III.A.1 and 2.
81. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
82. Klotz, 311 S.W.3d at 774-75 (Wolff, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 777-78. Missouri’s historical test mirrors that which is used by the federal courts
in applying the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s trial by jury guarantee in civil
cases. Id. at 776. The Seventh Amendment provides that “the right of trial by jury shall be
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“inviolate” analysis, for it determined (or more reiterated) that wrongful
death claims, no matter if they originate from a healthcare provider’s
negligent actions, have “no common-law antecedent” and therefore are not
protected from legislative interference.84
Mr. Sanders contended that his wrongful death claim should have been
recognized, and thus analyzed, as a common law action because it “ar[ose]
out of the underlying tort of medical negligence” and so was in reality a
common law action.85 Medical malpractice is rooted in English and
American common law.86 If wrongful death claims so predicated were
analyzed with relation to, or as no different from, the ancient action of

preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII. As is
the case in Missouri, federal courts generally determine whether a jury trial attaches to a civil
action by distinguishing between suits that were brought in courts of law and courts of equity,
or modern analogues of those actions. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974); City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999). At common law,
jury trials were available in legal actions, but not in actions at equity. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 194;
State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. banc 2003). Therefore, pursuant to
the Seventh Amendment, claims that were in existence as of 1791 when that amendment was
enacted and which were legal, as opposed to equitable, actions are triable by a jury. See
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 559 (7th ed. 2008). While complexities in the
development of Anglo-American law make construction of a bright-line rule defining “legal”
and “equitable” actions difficult, suits that sought only money damages were generally
considered actions at law, while those seeking an injunction or some other non-monetary
remedy were generally deemed equitable in nature. See Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 86.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry,
415 U.S. 558 (1996), was divided over correct application of the Seventh Amendment test in
actions not in existence prior to 1791. See 415 U.S. at 561-74 (Marshall, J.), 574-81
(Brennan, J, concurring), 581-84 (Stevens, J., concurring), 584-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court announced the application of the test in such
circumstances thusly: “First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in
the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine
the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.” Id. at 417-18
(internal citations omitted). In Chauffeurs, Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality’s
application of the historical test, which he believed “needlessly convolutes our Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence.” Chauffeurs, 415 U.S. at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring). He
supported eliminating the first step of the analysis and relying solely on the action’s remedy,
id. at 574, 577, writing that “there remains little purpose to our rattling through dusty attics of
ancient writs. The time has come to borrow William of Occam’s razor and sever this portion of
the analysis.” Id. at 575. The Diehl Court similarly advocated an analysis focused primarily on
the action’s remedy. See Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 86.
84. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 203 (quoting Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 88) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
85. Id. at 204.
86. See Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638.
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“mala praxis,”87 the right to a jury trial, with all of its incidents, would be
available to plaintiffs bringing forth such claims. The Court, however, was
neither convinced by this argument, nor willing to critically re-examine its
precedents.88 Judge Price wrote:
Missouri does not recognize a common-law claim for wrongful death. This
Court has reaffirmed time and time again that “a claim for damages for
wrongful death is statutory; it has no common-law antecedent.” In its
present form, the action for wrongful death is provided by section
537.080.1, RSMo 2000. The legislature has the power to define the remedy
available if it creates the cause of action.89

The Court, citing the Adams decision, declared that the legislature’s ability
to “create and abolish causes of action” carries with it a concomitant power
to “limit recovery in those causes of action.”90
2. Separation of Powers
Mr. Sanders also argued that section 538.210 violated the State’s
separation of powers provision.91 Missouri’s separation of powers clause is
contained within article II, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution.92 The
protection has “its origin in the jealousy of the framers of our state and
federal governments and the great solicitude to keep [the three branches of
government] separate in order to preserve the liberty of the people.”93 The
branches being co-equal, none may encroach upon the traditional powers
reserved to another.
Some contend that statutory limitations on damages create a “legislative
remittitur.”94 The judicial power of remittitur allows the court to decrease
excessive jury claims or, in the event of the plaintiff’s rejection of such a
lowered amount, order a new trial.95 The Illinois Supreme Court, for
example, held that caps on non-economic damages were unconstitutional
because legislative limits on such remedies interfere with the courts’ powers
to use their own discretion to limit jury verdicts.96 Mr. Sanders did not assert

87. See Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (Ga.
2010) (referring to medical malpractice as “mala praxis” and labeling it one of Blackstone’s
“private wrongs”).
88. See Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 203.
89. Id. (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 88).
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 204.
92. MO. CONST. art. II, § 1.
93. Rhodes v. Bell, 130 S.W. 465, 467 (Mo. 1910).
94. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078-81 (Ill. 1997).
95. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (9th ed. 2009).
96. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1078-81.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

FATAL MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MISSOURI’S PERVERSE INCENTIVE

159

that section 538.210 created a legislative remittitur.97 Instead, he contended
that the statute obstructs “the judiciary’s performance of its constitutionallyassigned power to render judgments in conformity with the jury’s verdict,” as
well as “the constitutional power and duty of the courts to enforce
judgments upon the verdict because it prevents the collection of part of the
damages the jury found to be fair, reasonable and appropriate.”98
The Court was not disposed to overturn its precedents. It declared that
“section 538.210 interferes neither with the jury’s ability to render a verdict
nor with the judge’s task of entering judgment; rather, it informs those
duties.”99 Judge Price determined that finding for Mr. Sanders “would be to
tell the legislature it could not legislate; it could neither create nor negate
causes of action, and in doing so could not prescribe the measure of
damages for the same.”100
B.

The Dissent

Judge George W. Draper, III, writing for the dissent, saw no
constitutional difficulties in upholding Mr. Sanders’s jury verdict, writing that
section 538.210 “represents an impermissible burden on the inviolate right
to a trial by jury . . . and the separation of powers . . . .”101
In his examination of the constitutionality of damages limitations, Judge
Draper employed the more direct mode of analysis used by the Court in the
Diehl decision, discussed in Part IV, infra. Invoking the Diehl test, he stated:
“If the action is a civil action for damages, then the right to a jury trial
attaches and must ‘remain inviolate.’”102 He further wrote:
Section 538.210 nullifies the jury’s finding of fact regarding the amount of
damage actually suffered by the plaintiff by requiring the court to reduce a
non-economic damages award determined by a jury that exceeds the
statutorily imposed limit. This undermines one of the jury’s most basic
functions and the plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury.103

Medical wrongful death claims are triable by a jury (unless the right is
waived)104 and, because limitations on the right to a jury trial violates the

97. Appellant’s Second Brief at 45, Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. banc
2012) (No. SC 91492).
98. Id.
99. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 205.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 215 (Draper, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 214-15 (quoting Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 84).
103. Id. at 215.
104. See MO. REV. STAT. § 510.190.1 (2012).
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“inviolate” nature of the right, limitations on the amount of damages a jury
may award a plaintiff in such claims violate the Missouri Constitution.105
Judge Draper also argued that section 538.210 violates Missouri’s
separation of powers provision because it places limitations on the
judiciary’s ability to limit jury verdicts through the power of remittitur.106
Sanders stands for the proposition that the right to bring a wrongful
death action predicated on medical malpractice is subject to the whims of
the Missouri General Assembly, such that the legislature is not
constitutionally constrained from limiting those actions’ available remedies,
as well from legislating such actions out of existence.107 Missouri juries are
limited in their right to assess damages as they may judge fair and adequate
–– a right consistent with their traditional role as finders of fact –– and so
are limited in their ability to fully compensate the survivors of victims of fatal
medical negligence.108 Therefore, absent constitutional amendment,
legislative action, or express overruling by the Supreme Court of Missouri,
the emotional pain and distress caused by the death of a loved one is worth
no more than $350,000 if the tortfeasor is a healthcare provider.
IV. STATE EX REL. DIEHL V. O’MALLEY: THE UNLIKELY CASE TO SUPPORT A CASE FOR
A PROHIBITION ON CAPS IN MEDICAL WRONGFUL DEATH SUITS
Section 538.210’s remaining cap on fatal medical malpractice claims
violates principles of fairness, and its existence in the absence of
corresponding caps on personal injury medical malpractice claims belies
common sense. Importantly, such caps are not consistent with the mode of
analysis laid out in the Missouri Supreme Court case of State ex rel. Diehl v.
O’Malley. Decided in 2003, Diehl does not involve physician negligence; if
relied on strictly because of its facts the case would be irrelevant to medical
malpractice litigation.109 However, the Diehl Court’s application of article I,
section 22(a) provides a simple and straightforward test that can be applied

105. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 215 (Draper, J., dissenting).
106. See id. Missouri courts recognize both remittitur and additur. See MO. REV. STAT. §
537.068 (2012). An “additur” order allows a court to increase a plaintiff’s damages. Tucci v.
Moore, 875 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Mo. banc 1994).
107. The general wrongful death act, contained in section 537.080 et seq., is subject to
the possible imposition of legislative alterations, or even abrogation. See Sanders, 364
S.W.3d at 204 n.8. Judge Price noted by way of example that the wrongful death act
contained a $5,000 damage cap when originally enacted in 1855. Id. No such cap currently
exists. See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.090 (1979).
108. Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 777 (Mo. banc 2010) (per curiam)
(Wolff, J., concurring) (“This concept of the jury as the fact finder is rooted in Missouri’s history
as is the idea that its verdict should not be disturbed.”) (internal citations omitted).
109. In fact, its language has been cited in support of the denial of a common law right to
wrongful death. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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to medical wrongful death actions in such a way as to end the disparity in
the law in favor of the loved ones of fatal medical malpractice victims.110
A.

Diehl and Civil Actions for Damages

The litigation in Diehl concerned Kathleen Diehl’s suit against her
employer pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).111 The MHRA
bars discrimination by an employer based on “race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, ancestry, age or disability . . . .”112 Ms. Diehl brought suit in
circuit court after receiving a “right to sue” letter from the Missouri
Commission on Human Rights.113 On appeal from the trial court’s rejection
of her motion for a jury,114 the Supreme Court, Judge Wolff presiding, asked
whether article I, section 22(a) applies to MHRA damage actions.115 A
unanimous Court, with Judge Price not participating, held that it did.116
Judge Wolff began his opinion by laying forth the historical test courts
use to determine article I, section 22(a)’s reach,117 explaining that “the
provision is intended to guarantee a right, not to restrict a right.”118 After
examining the jury trial provisions contained within the territorial laws of
Louisiana Territory and Missouri, which included a provision affording
litigants jury trials in “all civil cases of the value of one hundred dollars,”119
Judge Wolff declared, “the simple analysis is whether the action is a ‘civil
action’ for damages. If so, the jury trial is to ‘remain inviolate.’”120
Two Missouri cases in particular guided the Court in reaching the
conclusion that statutory actions not in existence as of 1820 still appreciate
article I, section 22(a)’s full protection:121 Briggs v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co.122
and Bates v. Comstock Realty.123 In Briggs, the Court held that the right to a
jury attaches “in all cases in which an issue of fact, in an action for the
recovery of money only, is involved, whether the right or liability is one at

110. See infra Part IV.B.
111. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 84; see MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (2012).
112. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055.1(1).
113. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 84.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 92.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
118. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 84.
119. Id. at 85 (quoting MO. TERR. LAWS 58, § 13). Judge Wolff noted that the right to trial
by jury existed before the territory of Missouri adopted the common law in 1816. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 86.
122. 20 S.W. 32 (Mo. 1892).
123. 267 S.W. 641 (Mo. 1924).
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common law or is one created by statute.”124 Bates held that proceedings
involving a special tax bill unknown to common law courts were amenable
to jury trials because they were “of like nature” (i.e., analogous) to actions
able to be tried by juries at common law.125 Therefore, based on past
statutory and case law precedent, Diehl concluded that the test for
determining whether a case is afforded article I, section 22(a)’s guarantees
involves asking the simple question: is the claim a civil action for
damages?126 If it is, and if it is sufficiently analogous to a common law
action, then it is afforded the right to trial by jury’s full protections.127
The MHRA’s provision of a remedy for workplace discrimination was not
a right colorable under Missouri’s common law.128 However, in applying the
rule gleaned from its precedents, the Court held that the claim was
sufficiently analogous to common law actions for trespass, for which pre1820 Missouri courts granted damage remedies.129 Actions for trespass
“included actions for a variety of wrongs to the person” which are “now
commonly referred to categorically as torts . . . .”130 Therefore, Ms. Diehl’s
claim was constitutionally protected by article I, section 22(a), and the Court
accordingly overruled the trial court’s denial of her motion for a jury.131
B.

Application of the Diehl Test to Medical Wrongful Death Suits

A physician’s negligent actions caused Mrs. Sanders’s injuries and
subsequent death. Mr. Sanders argued that his wrongful death suit was
deserving of the full incidents of the constitutional right to a trial by jury
because it was predicated on “the underlying tort of medical negligence
and, therefore, existed at common law.”132 Because suits seeking damages
for death at the hands of a negligent healthcare provider are “civil actions
for damages,” and both fatal and non-fatal medical malpractice claims are
predicated on a healthcare provider’s negligence,133 Mr. Sanders’s medical

124. Briggs, 20 S.W. at 33 (discussed and quoted in Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 86).
125. Bates, 267 S.W. at 644; Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 86.
126. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 85; cf. Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 214-15 (Mo. banc
2012) (Draper, J., dissenting).
127. Diehl, 95 S.W.3d at 86 (“The fact that an action is brought pursuant to statute,
whether in existence at the time of the 1820 Constitution or enacted later, does not exclude
the prospect of a right to jury. The question is, according to Bates: is the claim ‘analogous to’
actions brought at the time of the state’s original 1820 Constitution?”).
128. See id. at 87-88.
129. Id. at 87.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 92.
132. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d 195, 215.
133. Compare Montgomery v. South Cnty. Radiologists, Inc., 168 S.W.3d 685, 691 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2005) (listing the elements of personal injury medical malpractice), with Watson v.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

FATAL MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND MISSOURI’S PERVERSE INCENTIVE

163

wrongful death claim was, and indeed all medical wrongful death claims
are, deserving of the full incidents of article I, section 22(a)’s guarantees
under Diehl’s “civil action for damages” test. Mr. Sanders’s claim at least
deserved more than the perfunctory examination it received from the Court.
Inconsistencies in judicial application of the rule that wrongful death has no
common law antecedents further buttress this argument.134
As it is incontrovertible that an action for wrongful death seeking
monetary relief is a civil action for damages, fatal medical negligence meets
the first prong of the Diehl test. That the “analogous” prong is met is best
exemplified by the identical showings plaintiffs in fatal and non-fatal medical
negligence suits must make in order to hold a healthcare provider liable.
Missouri courts have established that plaintiffs in medical malpractice
actions must prove the following elements to establish a prima facie case:
(1) an act or omission of the defendant failed to meet the requisite standard
of medical care; (2) the act or omission was performed negligently; and (3)
the act or omission caused the plaintiff’s injuries.135

In wrongful death medical malpractice actions plaintiffs must establish the
aforementioned elements, as well as prove that the physician’s negligent act
or omission was the cause of the decedent’s death.136 The actions are
therefore identical save for the resulting injury; in both scenarios a
healthcare provider behaves unreasonably and in so behaving harms the
patient. If the Diehl Court was able to find that a statutorily-created cause of
action authorizing a remedy for discrimination based, in part, on race and
sex was analogous to forms of action from 19th-century Missouri137 — a
state admitted to the Union as a slave state138 and which upheld such a
right in human chattel until enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment139 —
then medical wrongful death, which is caused by the same type of physician
negligence that the common law deemed unreasonable, should similarly be
found to be sufficiently analogous to a common law action.
The rule that wrongful death was absent at common law descends from
Lord Ellenborough’s 1808 pronouncement in the English case of Baker v.
Bolton that “[i]n a [c]ivil court, the death of a human being could not be

Tenet Healthsystem SL, Inc., 304 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (listing the elements
of wrongful death medical malpractice).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 140-46.
135. Mueller v. Bauer, 54 S.W.3d 652, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
136. Super v. White, 18 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
137. See supra text accompanying note 127.
138. See Joseph Fred Benson, Ages of the Law: A Brief Legal History of Missouri, Part I –
1803 to 1860, 68 J. MO. B. 24, 27 (2012).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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complained of as an injury.”140 While American jurisdictions predominantly
accepted the Baker rule,141 many cases are inapposite,142 such as the
Missouri case of James v. Christy,143 decided in 1853 (two years before the
enactment of Missouri’s wrongful death statute),144 in which the Supreme
Court of Missouri recognized a father’s right to recover damages for the loss
of society or comforts of his deceased fifteen-year-old son.145 Other
examples include the Connecticut medical wrongful death case of Cross v.
Guthery, decided in 1794, in which a husband was able to recover for loss
of “the service, company and consortship” of his wife, and the 1972
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision of Gaudette v. Webb, which
140. Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 70 Eng. Rep. 1033 (cited in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 383 (1970)).
141. See, e.g., Carey v. Berkshire R.R. Co., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 480 (1848),
overruled by Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972). Carey was the first
American case to adopt the Baker rule. Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17
STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1067 (1965).
142. The United States Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375 (1970), made the most compelling plea for judicial recognition of a common law right to
bring a wrongful death action. While specifically deciding whether there was a common law
right of action at wrongful death in general maritime jurisprudence, the Court declared quite
emphatically that the unanimous enactment of wrongful death statutes by the states “has
made the allowance of recovery for wrongful death the general rule of American law, and its
denial the exception.” Id. at 393. Along with Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794), the
Moragne Court cited Sullivan v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 23 Fed.Cas. 368 (C.C. Neb. 1874),
and Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854), as examples of early American courts that refused
to adopt Baker v. Bolton’s holding denying a common law right to recovery for wrongful
death. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 384. The Moragne Court believed that “[t]he most likely reason
that the English rule was adopted in this country without much question is simply that it had
the blessing of age.” Id. at 386. Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (D. Me. 1825), and Ford
v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838), are further examples of early American
courts that disregarded Baker. Malone, supra note 141, at 1066-67.
143. 18 Mo. 162 (1853).
144. State ex rel. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. of Maine v. Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 150
(Mo. banc 1976) (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
145. James, 18 Mo. at 164. Over one hundred years later, Judge Bardgett of the Supreme
Court of Missouri wrote of James:
James v. Christy, although not called a wrongful death action, was an action by which
the father could recover what is now compensatory wrongful death damages.
Additionally, it might be noted that the damages to the father in James v. Christy
included loss of society and comfort and there was no limitation on the amount . . . .
What is also rather striking about the opinion in [James], is that it simply states the
situation as it existed in and prior to 1853. In other words, here were judges of this
court who had practiced law in Missouri and by their experience knew what was going
on at that time simply reciting that this type of suit was then being entertained in courts
of this state. I can hardly believe that the judges of this court would have acknowledged
the existence of such a cause of action unless it did actually exist.
Clark, 536 S.W.2d at 151 (emphasis added).
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declared that “the law in this Commonwealth has . . . evolved to the point
where it may now be held that the right to recovery for wrongful death is of
common law origin . . . .”146 So, while Missouri and most modern courts
may view wrongful death –– no matter the predicate tort –– as a statutorilycreated cause of action, there is precedent supporting the proposition that
the connection between personal injury and wrongful death actions is not so
tenuous.
Perusing old and voluminous cases for definitive assurance that wrongful
death was indeed a part of American common law is unnecessary if
Missouri courts apply the flexible test formulated in Diehl.147 A wrongful
death claim for damages at the hands of a physician is a civil action for
damages. Further, wrongful death medical malpractice suits are predicated
on the same type of actions as are personal injury medical malpractice suits
–– a healthcare provider’s negligence.148 So, under the Diehl test, a medical
wrongful death complainant is entitled to the same inviolate right to a trial
by jury, along with the full award determined by the jury, as are non-fatal
medical malpractice plaintiffs.149 Application of this test in Sanders would
have resulted in the elimination of section 538.210’s medical wrongful
death non-economic damages cap.150

146. Cross, 2 Root at 90-91 (declaring that “the defendant, who then was, and for many
years had been a practicing physician, and professed to be well skilled in surgery . . .
performed [the] operation in the most unskillful, ignorant and cruel manner, contrary to the
well-known rules and principles of practice in such cases . . . and . . . after said operation the
plaintiff’s wife languished for about three hours and then died of the wound given by the hand
of the defendant”); Gaudette, 284 N.E.2d at 229.
147. State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. banc 2003).
148. See supra text accompanying note 133.
149. Read broadly, this test would mean that no wrongful death claims for damages could
be legislatively limited. While this Note issues no opinion as to such an application of Diehl, a
narrow application of the “analogous” prong could actually limit the amount of wrongful
death claims to which article I, section 22(a) attaches. This Note merely argues that, due to
medical wrongful death’s similarities to personal injury medical malpractice, medical wrongful
death claims should be free from the same limitations of which medical personal injury claims
are free.
150. Application of the Diehl test is not the only viable argument in support of abolishing
section 538.210’s remaining cap. While Missouri’s original constitution was established in
1820, two other constitutions were adopted before the recent 1945 Constitution was enacted.
See Alexander Muntges, Forget Batson, 68 J. MO. B. 218, 219 (2012); Joseph J. Simeone,
The Legal History of the State of Missouri, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1395, 1402 (1995); Aaron E.
Schwartz, Comment, Dusting Off the Blaine Amendment: Two Challenges to Missouri’s AntiEstablishment Tradition, 73 MO. L. REV. 129, 167 (2008). Missouri has recognized a cause of
action for wrongful death since the first wrongful death act was enacted in 1855, if not earlier.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-45 (discussing the case of James v. Christy, 18 Mo.
162 (1853)). If 1945, the date the current Missouri Constitution was enacted, was used to
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V. SANDERS, WATTS, AND MISSOURI HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS’ PERVERSE INCENTIVE
In Missouri it matters a great deal whether a physician’s negligence
causes a patient’s injury, or death. Sanders, together with the subsequent
decision in Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers,151 has created a reality
in which negligent healthcare providers owe potentially less in tort if their
actions cause death instead of personal injury.152 The Sanders-Watts
imbalance has therefore created for Missouri physicians and other
healthcare providers a perverse incentive, based on simple economics, to
kill rather than injure.153 Missouri is currently at a crossroads. It must end the
disparity in its medical damages law based on its own notions of fairness
and equity. Hopefully, this disparity will be resolved for the benefit of the
families of victims of fatal medical malpractice.
A.

Perverse Incentive

This Note is not daring to assert that before each operation or treatment
decision Missouri physicians determine the probability that their actions will
result in the patient’s death and so alter their course of treatment
accordingly in order to minimize potential liability. Such a calculation is
unrealistic in that it assumes that physicians can correctly predict the amount
of non-economic damages (not to mention economic and punitive
damages) that a jury will award in the event of negligent injury.154
Importantly, such an assertion does a disservice to the men and women who
dedicate their professional careers to the provision of care for the sick and
dying.
The healthcare industry’s clientele, as exemplified by the very purpose of
the industry, do not enlist the services of a physician when they are healthy.
While section 538.210’s limitations are unfair to families of victims of fatal
medical negligence, it is equally true that we must not deter good medical
care by punishing healthcare providers for deaths and injuries that were
near certain to occur with or without their services.155 Proponents of medical
tort reform argue that excessive medical malpractice damages induce
frame the right to jury trial analysis instead of 1820, statutory limitations on wrongful death
damages would be precluded as interfering with a pre-constitution right of action.
151. 376 S.W.3d 633, 648 (Mo. banc 2012).
152. See supra Part I.
153. See infra Part V.A.
154. See generally Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty within Jury Systems, 19
GEO. MASON L. REV. 513, 513 (2012) (discussing the uncertainty of juries); but see Valerie P.
Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 380 (2011).
155. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 488-89
(Wash. banc 1983) (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting) (“[The medical] profession affords [the
physician] only an inexact and often experimental science by which to discharge his duty.
Moreover, the tendency to place blame on a physician who fails to find a cure is great.”).
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physicians to practice defensive medicine (resulting in the employment of
procedures that, depending on the circumstances, may be dangerous),156 or
even move to more physician-friendly jurisdictions157 (which in turn may
cause physician shortages).158 The elimination of all remaining medical
damage caps in Missouri is not good policy if such a result would cause
physicians to leave Missouri or apply expensive or dangerous procedures for
fear of unfair and excessive civil penalties.
However, the perverse incentive that Missouri physicians have to kill
rather than injure is very real and very serious. If the Missouri legislature
enacted a statute that capped the amount of non-economic damages that a
negligent automobile driver could be held liable for in damages at, say,
$500,000, while leaving non-fatal automobile injury actions without a cap,
then a driver who negligently struck a pedestrian would have the economic
incentive to back up in order to limit his or her liability in tort.159 The
existence of such a possibility would reflect poorly on our society’s values,
and would do little to promote the deterrent aspirations of tort law.160 So too
156. Jill Fairchild, The Defensive Medicine Debate: Driven by Special Interests, 19 ANNALS
HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 297, 299-300 (2010), http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/
law/centers/healthlaw/pdfs/advancedirective/pdfs/issue4/fairchild.pdf. Defensive medicine
refers to “care provided solely (or mostly) to reduce the probability of litigation.” Michelle M.
Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for
Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606 (2002).
157. See Allen Kachalia et al., Physician Responses to the Malpractice Crisis: From
Defense to Offense, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 416, 416 (2005) (writing that traditional physician
responses to fears of unfair medical malpractice litigation include relocation).
158. John W. Hill et al., Law and the Healthcare Crisis: The Impact of Medical Malpractice
and Payment Systems on Physician Compensation and Workload as Antecedents of Physician
Shortages – Analysis, Implications, and Reform Solutions, 2010 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 91,
95-6 (2010) (writing that many physicians argue that “because malpractice costs are so
affecting the profitability of physician practices, physicians are being driven from practicing in
some jurisdictions, thereby contributing to a problem of physician shortages in some locales
and specialties.”).
159. Dean Prosser famously wrote that before enactment of the wrongful death statutes, it
was more economically prudent “‘to kill a man than to scratch him.’” VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET
AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 586 (Thomson Reuters, 12th
ed. 2010). Just as would a cap on automobile wrongful death actions, Sanders’s refusal to
afford article I, section 22(a)’s protections to fatal medical negligence suits allowed further
developments – the Watts case – to resurrect such a barbaric state of affairs in Missouri.
160. Many commentators believe that “[e]ach case in a common law system creates the
potential for normative articulation and deterrent impact.” Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of
Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 183 (2012). Professors Franklin Cleckley and Govind
Hariharan argued that medical malpractice caps undercut the deterrent effect of civil
litigation, writing: “Not only do damage caps tell the medical profession that we do not mind
if inefficient doctors continue to practice, the caps also tell victims of malpractice that their
suffering is inconsequential compared to the happiness of inefficient doctors.” Cleckley &
Govind, supra note 72, at 64. See also id. at 18 (writing that “we cannot sacrifice human lives
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does section 538.210’s remaining cap cast a shadow over Missouri’s civil
justice system and culture, for no matter the physician’s intentions, there is
the very real possibility that a patient’s death may result in less liability than
if that patient were to survive the negligent application of healthcare
services. The villain in this tale is not the Missouri healthcare provider, but
the legal reality that death is cheaper than life under Missouri medical
malpractice law.
B.

Potential Paths: Alabama and Texas’s Solutions

Sanders, Watts, and Diehl cannot all be correct. Either medical wrongful
death is not worthy of the full incidents of the right to trial by jury and Diehl’s
application beyond its facts is a misapplication of that decision, or the
Sanders majority’s failure to apply Diehl to medical wrongful death claims
was incorrect as not in line with viable precedent. Either the courts or the
legislature must rectify the imbalance. Throughout the preceding years,
states have variously upheld and abrogated damage caps.161 Developments
in Alabama and Texas demonstrate the potential paths Missouri may take.
In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association, the Alabama Supreme Court
held that section 6-5-544(b) of Alabama’s Medical Liability Act, which
capped “the amount of recovery for noneconomic losses . . . either to the
injured plaintiff, the plaintiff’s spouse, or other lawful dependents or any of
them together” at $400,000,162 violated the state constitution’s jury trial and
equal protection provisions.163 The case did not address the $1,000,000
cap on wrongful death medical negligence claims codified in section 6-5-

so that a handful of incompetent doctors can afford to buy expensive cars; surely human
beings are worth more than the trinkets they manufacture.”).
161. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991), Lebron v.
Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (striking down non-economic caps);
MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E 2d 405 (W. Va. 2011), and Oliver v. Magnolia
Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012) (upholding caps).
162. ALA. CODE. § 6-5-544(b), held unconstitutional by Moore, 592 So.2d at 171.
163. Moore, 592 So.2d at 171. The Alabama Court stated: “[I]n cases involving damages
incapable of precise measurement, a party has a constitutionally protected right to receive the
amount of damages fixed by a jury unless the verdict is so flawed by bias, passion, prejudice,
corruption, or improper motive as to lose its constitutional protection.” Id. at 162. While the
Moore Court also held that section 6-5-544(b) violated the Alabama Constitution’s guarantee
of equal protection, id. at 170-71, the Supreme Court of Alabama has since held that the
state’s constitution contains no equal protection guarantee. Ex parte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172,
1181 (Ala. 1999); Marc James Ayers, Interpreting the Alabama Constitution, 71 ALA. LAW.
286, 289 (2010). However, in 2003 the Supreme Court of Alabama refused to revisit its
decision in Moore even though that decision was based, in part, on an interpretation of a
non-existent right. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hogden, 884 So.2d. 801, 813-14 (Ala.
2003).
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547 of the Act,164 which indicates that Alabama physicians operated under
conditions similar to those currently existing in Missouri under the SandersWatts imbalance. However, the Alabama Court cured any such imbalance
four years later when it held that the cap on medical wrongful death
damages was similarly violative of the state’s jury trial and equal protection
provisions.165
If section 538.210 is not completely severed from Chapter 538,
however, Missouri may go the way of Texas. Texas physicians face the
possible prospect of paying more in damages for injuring a patient than for
causing one’s death.166 Section 74.301 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code167 provides a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in
all medical malpractice claims,168 and section 74.303169 provides a
$500,000 cap on all damages in medical wrongful death claims.170 The
Texas Supreme Court in Rose v. Doctors Hospital,171 held that limitations on
damage caps in wrongful death actions do not violate the Texas
Constitution.172 Therefore, Texas plaintiffs bringing forth a suit for wrongful
death against a healthcare professional must suffer the application of
sections 74.301 and 74.303’s caps.173 So, just as is currently the law in
Missouri, “under Texas law it is cheaper to kill than to maim.”174
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Applying the flexible test articulated in Diehl,175 the Sanders Court could
have found that a claim for wrongful death predicated on a healthcare
professional’s negligence is as deserving of the full benefits of Missouri’s
right to trial by jury as are claims for personal injury caused by medical
malpractice. If the Sanders Court would have embraced such a rule then not
164. ALA. CODE § 6-5-547, held unconstitutional by Smith v. Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334,
1344 (Ala. 1995) (per curiam), abrogated on other grounds by Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d
865 (Ala. 2001).
165. Smith, 671 So. 2d at 1344. In 2007, the Alabama Court refused to overrule the
Smith decision’s invalidation of section 6-5-547’s caps. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n v. Tyler, 981
So. 2d. 1077, 1105 (Ala. 2007).
166. See Watters, supra note 73, at 749-50.
167. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 73.301 (2003).
168. Watters, supra note 73, at 756-57.
169. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 74.303 (2003).
170. Watters, supra note 73, at 758.
171. 801 S.W.2d 841, 841 (Tex. 1990).
172. Id. at 848.
173. Watters, supra note 73, at 760.
174. Christine Lockhart, The Safest Care is to Deny Care: Implications of Corporate Health
Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance on HMO Liability in Texas, 41 S. TEX. L. REV.
621, 636 (2000).
175. State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. banc 2003).
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only would Mr. Sanders and his family have kept their full jury award, but
the Watts Court’s prohibition of caps on non-economic damages in the
latter class of cases would not have created the perverse incentive that
Missouri physicians operate under currently.176 If the courts or the legislature
fail to solve the imbalance in favor of plaintiffs like Mr. Sanders, the future
will likely result in either a continuation of the status quo, or a cure of the
imbalance by way of either legislation or a constitutional amendment that
serves to overturn Watts.177 A constitutional attack through the courts is the
most likely means by which section 538.210’s remaining limitation would
be invalidated, given the legislature’s proclivity for tort reform.
A.

Possible Constitutional Challenges

It may be some time before a case is litigated before Missouri’s Supreme
Court that will provide it with an opportunity to overrule Sanders. The Court
previously held that section 538.210 did not violate the State’s equal
protection, open courts, trial by jury, or due process provisions in the Adams
decision.178 However, the Court’s rejection of Adams’s jury trial holding in
Watts may have opened the door for further constitutional contests to
section 538.210.179 The following are suggestions for possible-constitutional
challenges to section 538.210’s remaining cap, excluding litigation based
on the right to trial by jury, which has been discussed above.180
1. Equal Protection
Missouri’s equal protection clause is located in article I, section 2 of the
Missouri Constitution.181 That clause declares that “all persons are created
equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the
law . . . .”182 Missouri courts apply the following test to determine whether
the equal protection clause has been violated:
The first step is a determination of whether the classification operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class or impinges on a fundamental right. If so,
the classification is subject to strict scrutiny and will only be upheld if it is

176. See supra Part V.A.
177. See, e.g., H.B. 112, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013).
178. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 905-07.
179. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 646.
180. This is not meant to be an exhaustive compilation of constitutional challenges to
section 538.210, but merely an example of some of the more probable challenges. For a preWatts discussion on the matter see Passanante & Mefford, supra note 51.
181. MO. CONST. art. I, § 2.
182. Id.
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necessary to a compelling state interest. If not, the classification is upheld if
it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.183

A suspect classification is one that embodies “invidious discrimination,” such
as classifications based on race.184 Fundamental rights encompass such
liberties as freedom of speech and the right to vote.185 Medical malpractice
victims are unlikely to be regarded as members of a suspect class,186 and
the Missouri Supreme Court may be unwilling to hold that section
538.210’s remaining cap invades a fundamental right if it does not also
find that the statute is otherwise unconstitutional.187 Therefore, an equal
protection analysis will likely be conducted under rational basis review.
While the Adams decision declared that section 538.210 did not violate
plaintiffs’ equal protection rights,188 litigants may argue that the legal reality
created by Sanders and Watts treats plaintiffs suing for the death of a loved
one irrationally different from those suing for non-fatal injuries, without any
foundation based on a legitimate state interest.189 The Missouri Supreme
Court may agree with its ruling in Adams, which upheld section 538.210
under rational basis review because it “represents an effort by the legislature
to reduce rising medical malpractice premiums and in turn prevent
physicians and others from discontinuing ‘high risk’ practices and
procedures.”190 It is not apparent, however, exactly what legitimate state
interest is being served by fostering Missourians’ risk of falling prey to the
effects of a perverse incentive in medical negligence law.

183. In re Care & Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. banc 2007) (internal
citations omitted).
184. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo. banc 1991)
(stating that suspect classes are “those based upon race, national origin or illegitimacy, which
because of historical reasons, ‘command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.’”) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)).
185. Id. (stating that fundamental rights “include the rights to free speech, to vote, freedom
of interstate travel, the right to personal privacy and other basic liberties”).
186. The Adams Court in fact “reject[ed] the notion that victims of medical malpractice are
a suspect class.” Adams v. Childrens Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. banc 1992).
187. See id. (rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention that their fundamental rights had been
invaded, even assuming that the constitutional rights to open courts, trial by jury, and certain
remedies were fundamental rights, because such rights were not held to have been violated by
section 538.210).
188. Id. at 905.
189. See Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys & Circuit Att’ys Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot Cnty., 256 S.W.3d
98, 102 (Mo. banc 2008) (“The rational basis test requires only that the challenged law bear
some relationship to a legitimate state interest.”).
190. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 904.
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2. Separation of Powers
Judge Draper, in his Sanders dissent, opined that as well as violating
Missourians’ right to trial by jury, section 538.210 violates Missouri’s
separation of powers provision, codified in article II, section 1 of the
Missouri Constitution.191 That provision states:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments — the legislative, executive and judicial — each of which shall
be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of
persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of
the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted.192

A litigant could argue that section 538.210 acts as an unconstitutional
legislative remittitur, as was held by Judge Draper in his Sanders dissent.193
3. Due Process
Missouri’s due process clause, located in article I, section 10 of the
Missouri Constitution, provides that “no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.”194 Missouri courts evaluate
whether a procedural due process violation has occurred by assessing (1)
whether an individual was deprived of a liberty or property interest and, if
such a deprivation occurred, (2) whether the deprivation was accompanied
by “constitutionally sufficient” procedures.195
Successfully convincing a tribunal that section 538.210’s remaining cap
on medical wrongful death damages violates due process may require novel
argumentation, as a due process claim was quite curtly struck down in
Adams.196 However, a court may prove sympathetic to the argument that
section 538.210 lacks constitutional sufficiency because its application
deprives the litigant of his or her right to a hearing before a jury of his or her
peers — consistent with all of that right’s incidents — in a civil action
sounding in tort, and because there is a high risk that an assessment of
damages at no more than $350,000 will not fully compensate a litigant.197

191. Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 215 (Mo. banc 2012) (Draper, J., dissenting).
192. MO. CONST. art. II, § 1.
193. Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 215 (Draper, J., dissenting).
194. MO. CONST. art. I, § 10.
195. City of Creve Coeur v. Nottebrok, 356 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
196. Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907.
197. In determining what process is due, the court should balance the following factors: (1)
the affected private interest; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation through use of the current
procedures, and the “probable value” of additional procedures; and (3) the government’s
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4. Other Challenges
Other challenges could possibly be made under Missouri’s open
courts,198 special laws,199 or other constitutional provisions if no arguments
based on Missouri’s right to trial by jury, equal protection, separation of
powers, or due process provisions prove successful.
B.

Constitutional Amendment

Opponents of section 538.210 could propose a constitutional
amendment prohibiting limitations on non-economic damages in medical
malpractice actions.200 Some state constitutions prohibit limitations on
recoverable damages in some form.201 However, it is more likely that any
constitutional amendment affecting damage caps would, given Missouri’s
largely conservative bent,202 provide the General Assembly with the
constitutional right to limit non-economic damages in medical malpractice
cases, as was the case with the amendment that resulted in Texas’ article III,
section 66(b).203
C. The General Assembly: Our Only Hope?
There is little chance that the legislature will soon eliminate the remnants
of section 538.210 and so further halt medical tort reform’s advances in
Missouri. However, the Missouri Supreme Court’s inability or refusal to
acknowledge that wrongful death predicated on the negligent actions of a
healthcare professional is a civil action for damages deserving of the full
incidents of a jury trial — including an undisturbed award of non-economic
damages — or that the Sanders decision is unconstitutional on other

interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); City of Kansas City v. Jordan,
174 S.W.3d 25, 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
198. MO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
199. MO. CONST. art. III, § 40.
200. See MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(a).
201. AM. MED. ASS’N, CAPS ON DAMAGES (2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/
doc/arc/capsdamages.pdf.
202. See Jack Wagman, Is Missouri a Red State Now?, STL TODAY (Nov. 6, 2010),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/is-missouri-a-red-state-now/article_44
d3e1dd-b922-580c-9264-9b0616c8f63a.html.
203. See Watters, supra note 73, at 767. Article III, section 66(b) states:
[T]he legislature by statute may determine the limit of liability for all damages and
losses, however characterized, other than economic damages, by a provider of
medical or health care. . . . This subsection applies without regard to whether the claim
or cause of action arises under or is derived from common law, a statute, or other
law. . . . The claim or cause of action includes a medical or health care liability claim
as defined by the legislature.
TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66(b).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

174

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 7:147

grounds will leave the task of curing section 538.210’s remaining inequities
to the men and women of the state legislature. Given the legislature’s recent
attempts to replace any common law right to bring a medical malpractice
action with a purely statutory remedy, the General Assembly’s efforts to cure
the imbalance will not likely result in the elimination of caps.204
VII. CONCLUSION
Mr. Sanders was deprived of his wife and of full compensation for his
injuries, injuries caused by a physician who was found by a Missouri jury to
have behaved negligently. Mr. Sanders did not receive his duly awarded jury
verdict, however, because of the difference between life and death. The
Sanders Court had the opportunity to find section 538.210 unconstitutional,
but its refusal to do so allowed future events to create for Missouri a
reprehensible condition in which death is cheaper than life. The courts, or
the legislature, can relieve healthcare providers and plaintiffs of the
abhorrence of the law’s perverse incentive; either body may legally abrogate
section 538.210, they need only have the will to right a legal wrong.
Hopefully action is taken before the law’s imbalance causes more plaintiffs
like Mr. Sanders to leave the courthouse with less than their constitutionally
entitled compensation. Hopefully, death will cease to be cheaper than life in
Missouri.
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